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COPYRIGHT LAW AND DIGITAL PIRACY: 
AN ECONOMETRIC GLOBAL CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY 
Antoni Terra* 
Digital piracy is a worldwide concern. Both very high and very 
low rates of intellectual property infringement threaten innovation, 
thus implying that some level of effective copyright regulation is 
required to incentivize the creation of original works. However, 
although Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
advocates for social access to culture as well as the protection of 
copyright, many countries do not yet have an economic and legal 
balance between authors and consumers. 
This article aims to identify which copyright law measures are 
more related to low/high digital piracy rates. To address that 
question, the author presents a picture of how the world of 
copyright is today. The empirical law and economics methodology 
used in this paper thus consists of a content analysis of 
significantly selected copyright law measures that have been more 
or less broadly implemented, or that have been dismissed by 108 
countries in their current national copyright statutes. After 
processing the resultant database (or coding scheme) with 
econometric and descriptive statistical tools, the findings suggest 
that: (1) the legal measures correlated to high digital piracy rates 
include the sweat of the brow doctrine and secondary liability 
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rules for Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”); (2) the measures 
most connected to low piracy rates are private copying and fair 
use provisions; (3) statutes that favor copyright holders are 
associated with greater rates of digital piracy; and (4) richer 
countries show lower levels of copyright infringement, which 
validates the development economics theory. Because there is no 
extant literature on this topic, these results constitute the first step 
toward a comprehensive cross-national quantitative study on 
comparative copyright law and digital piracy, both in descriptive 
and explanatory terms. 
Without doubt, this project will excite scholars in economics 
and intellectual property but will also intrigue international 
policymakers as the outcomes of this study provide core policy 
guidelines on copyright that legislatures and governments around 
the world can implement. These interdisciplinary 
recommendations are in line with designing a new and 
economically viable regulatory copyright model which aims to 
reduce piracy rates and to solve the global tension between 
authors and consumers in the digital era. 
 
From the earliest days at Apple, I realized that we thrived  
when we created intellectual property. 
If people copied or stole our software, we’d be out of business. 
If it weren’t protected, there’d be no incentive for us  
to make new software or product designs. 
If protection of intellectual property begins to disappear,  
creative companies will disappear or never get started. 
But there’s a simpler reason: It’s wrong to steal.  
It hurts other people. And it hurts your own character. 
Steve Jobs1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Technological advances expand society’s capabilities to new 
frontiers previously unimaginable. The classic contemporary 
                                                
 1 WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 396 (2011). 
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example is the Malthusian problem2 that governed the world since 
the dawn of man and was shattered by the technological 
developments which stimulated the Industrial Revolution. 3 
Approximately two hundred years later, the Digital Revolution, 
reinvigorated in the 1960s by Jack Kilby’s 4  invention of the 
microchip, has given new momentum to technological 
advancements intended to enhance our quality and enjoyment of 
life. It is clear that technology enhances human progress; however, 
its power can threaten creativity if not effectively regulated 
through intellectual property laws. This field, lying at the 
intersection of law, economics, science, and technology, has 
experienced a dramatic shift since the birth of the Internet, 
enabling copyright infringement in ways never before conceived. 
Hence, to fight against digital piracy, the proper treatment of 
copyright must become a legal policy priority issue which 
integrates an economic perspective.5 
                                                
 2 THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION, 
13–17 (J. Johnson, London 1798) (exhibiting Malthus’ analysis on how 
humanity would survive if the population increased in geometric progression 
while agricultural output grew arithmetically). 
 3 See GREGORY CLARK, A FAREWELL TO ALMS: A BRIEF ECONOMIC HISTORY 
OF THE WORLD, 2 Fig. 1.1 (Joel Mokyr ed., 2007),  
http://wiki.dpi.inpe.br/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=ser457-
cst310:a_clark_farewell_to_alms.pdf. It was precisely the transformation in 
production and energy that occurred between 1760 and 1830, id. at 3, that 
allowed society to escape the “Malthusian trap,” in which discoveries did not 
necessarily yield improvements in quality of life as the overall increase in 
wealth was offset by the increase in population Id. at 1–3. It was only after the 
Industrial Revolution that society had the necessary mechanisms to trigger the 
per capita income growth and the chance to finally start living better. Id. 
 4 The Nobel Prize in Physics 2000, NOBEL MEDIA,  
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/2000/ (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2016) (“The Nobel Prize in Physics 2000 was awarded . . . to Jack S. 
Kilby for his part in the invention of the integrated circuit.”). 
 5  See Green Paper: Unlocking the Potential of Cultural and Creative 
Industries, 2-3, COM (2010) 183 final (Apr. 27, 2010). The “cultural and 
creative industries” (“CCI”) accounted for 2.6% of the European Union’s GDP 
in 2010, and they provided employment to approximately five million people 
within the EU. Id. In the United States, CCI, known as “core copyright 
industries,” represented 6.4% of its GDP in 2010, and accounted for 3.9% of 
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The former Associate Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court Sandra Day O’Connor (1981-2006) rightly emphasized in 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.6 that the 
existence of an economic and legal balance between authors and 
consumers should be the guiding principle of any copyright 
legislation: 
The primary objective of copyright is not to 
reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts’ [Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution]. To 
this end, copyright assures authors the right to their 
original expression, but encourages others to build 
freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by 
a work. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. 
It is the means by which copyright advances the 
progress of science and art.7 
Professor Neil W. Netanel complemented Justice O’Connor’s 
vision with no less erudition: “Copyright law’s perennial dilemma 
is to determine where [authors’] exclusive rights should end and 
unrestrained public access should begin.”8 
The United States implemented the 1976 Copyright Act and 
subsequent amendments to achieve a fair compromise between 
authors and consumers to incentivize creativity, innovation, and 
originality; nonetheless, many countries have not yet reached this 
point. Thus, although Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights advocates for cultural participation as well as the 
protection of copyright,9 digital piracy unfortunately remains a 
                                                                                                         
employment. Stephen E. Siwek, Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy: The 
2011 Report, 5–10, International Intellectual Property Alliance 13 (2011). 
 6 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). 
 7 Id.  
 8 Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 
283, 285 (1996). 
 9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. 
A/810 Art. 27 (1948), “1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the 
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific 
advancement and its benefits. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the 
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worldwide concern. For instance, according to the BSA Global 
Software Survey 2016, 10  whose numbers are illustrative but 
probably overestimated, the world unlicensed PC software 
installation rate is 39%. Moreover, for the top 20 economies in 
commercial value of unlicensed PC software, the differences are 
striking: 17–24% for the United States, Japan, Australia, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands; 34-52% for 
France, South Korea, Spain, Italy, Brazil, and Mexico; and 58-84% 
for India, Russia, Argentina, Thailand, China, Vietnam, and 
Indonesia. 11  As will be later measured, unlicensed software 
installation rates are statistically greater for younger industrialized 
countries. 
Hence, to shed light on the global piracy rate problem, which is 
of an empirical nature but has policy implications, the research 
question that this article aims to answer is explanatory-based: 
“which copyright law measures are more related to low/high 
digital piracy rates?” This analysis relies primarily on data from 
WIPO Lex,12 the BSA Software Alliance (“BSA”),13 and the World 
Bank14 and represents a picture of how the copyright universe is 
                                                                                                         
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author.” 
 10 Seizing Opportunity Through License Compliance: BSA Global Software 
Survey 2016, BSA, THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, 7, (May 2016),  
http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2016/downloads/studies/BSA_GSS_US.pdf; see also 
Piracy of Digital Content, OECD,  
http://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/piracyofdigitalcontent.htm; David Price, 
Sizing the piracy universe, NETNAMES (Sept. 2013),  
http://copyrightalliance.org/sites/default/files/2013-netnames-piracy.pdf. But see 
Ivan P. L. Png, On the Reliability of Software Piracy Statistics (Electronic 
Commerce Research and Applications, Working Paper No. 5),  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1099325. 
 11 Seizing Opportunity Through License Compliance: BSA Global Software 
Survey 2016, supra note 10. 
 12 WIPO LEX, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
 13 THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, BSA Global Software Survey: The Compliance 
Gap, 
http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2013/downloads/studies/2013GlobalSurvey_Study_en
.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
 14 WORLD BANK OPEN DATA, http://data.worldbank.org (last visited Sept. 12, 
2016). 
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today. Thus, the empirical law and economics methodology 
employed here (see infra Section II) consists of a content analysis 
of significantly selected copyright law measures that have been 
more or less broadly implemented, or that have been dismissed, by 
108 countries in their current national copyright statutes. 
This article is divided in three main sections: literature review, 
methodology, and analysis-results. Regarding the latter, after a 
descriptive statistics note (Section III.A) the resultant database is 
processed with econometric tools to (1) identify the copyright law 
mechanisms (and/or control variables) that are more related to 
low/high digital piracy rates (Section III.B.1),15 and (2) assess 
whether statutes that generally favor copyright holders or those 
that favor consumers are associated with lower or higher rates of 
digital piracy (Section III.B.2). Therefore, based on its econometric 
results on copyright law mechanisms and/or control variables that 
are more related to low digital piracy rates, this article provides 
strategic guidelines and recommendations to intellectual property 
policymakers worldwide (Section III.C). That way, legislatures and 
governments have up-to-date empirical data to build a new and 
economically viable copyright model to correct the global tension 
between authors and consumers in the digital era, which would 
lead society to greater heights of wellbeing. Finally, to test their 
accuracy, the proposed policy guidelines are applied to the 
particular cases of the United States and Spain (Section III.D). 
Because there is no existing literature in the field with the 
scope that this article offers (see Section I), these results constitute 
the first step toward a comprehensive cross-national quantitative 
study on comparative copyright law and digital piracy, both in 
descriptive and explanatory terms. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are no econometric studies assessing the relation 
between piracy rates, copyright laws, and socioeconomic variables 
                                                
 15 The author coded, for instance, how broad the fair use doctrine or secondary 
liability rules for ISPs are in the selected 108 jurisdictions, and then used 
econometrics to observe their relationship with the respective national digital 
piracy rate. 
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across countries in a quantitative and internationally 
comprehensive fashion. Thus, one of the main contributions of this 
project is to fill the gap in the extant literature. However, papers 
addressing some particular issues of what this article directly or 
indirectly covers have been published. One can identify at least 
three lines of research in the previous literature that are significant 
for our purposes: the first, central, and still very unexplored line 
assesses the relationship between copyright law and digital piracy 
(it also aims tangentially at copyright regulation and sales). The 
second category focuses on development economics and its effect 
on intellectual property infringement. Finally, the third group is 
devoted to works that explain why individuals decide whether to 
engage in digital piracy. Moreover, this literature review includes a 
broadly examined field regarding digital piracy and sales as well as 
a final section about general reflections on copyright. These two 
latter areas of knowledge are not part of this article, but they have 
been included in the interest of completeness. 
A. Effects of Copyright Law on Digital Piracy and Sales 
One of the relevant trends in this field analyzes how 
strengthening laws against copyright infringement affects digital 
piracy, which is one of the main concerns of this project. Thus far 
in the literature, this issue has only been examined from an ad hoc 
perspective or from a theoretical standpoint. This paper combines 
both a comprehensive and an empirical approach to address 
whether harsher laws and their enforcement mechanisms are 
related to lower piracy rates. 
On the one hand, for the nature of this research, explanatory 
conclusions are not achievable through qualitative comparative 
studies on copyright, as the studies are much more suitable to 
understand the nuances of this discipline from a descriptive angle.16 
                                                
 16 Sanjeev Chaswal, Comparative Study of the Main Features of Copyright 
Law in India, INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE (2012); ALKA CHAWLA, LAW OF 
COPYRIGHT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (2013) (analyzing India, United 
Kingdom, United States, and the European Union); Shruti Rana, The Global 
Battle Over Copyright Reform: Developing the Rule of Law in the Chinese 
Business Context, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND FRANCIS KING CAREY SCHOOL OF 
LAW LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES (2013) (analyzing United States, 
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On the other hand, the ad hoc econometric papers on copyright 
provide contradictory evidence on whether tougher laws to fight 
copyright infringement increase or decrease digital piracy. This 
article addresses this issue in Section III.B. For instance, the 2009 
implementation of the HADOPI law in France,17 which was later 
revoked on July 8, 2013, is one of the best-known recent examples 
of this kind of literature. HADOPI introduced a graduated response 
in an attempt to increase compliance with copyright laws, the so-
called “three strikes” where individuals received a warning the first 
                                                                                                         
Japan, and Taiwan); Phil Sherrell (Ed.), International Comparative Legal Guide 
to Copyright 2015, GLOBAL LEGAL GROUP (2014) (analyzing 23 countries); 
COPYRIGHT INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, VOL. XIV, 
(Eugen Ulmer & Gerhard Schricker eds., 2007) (using qualitative studies to 
compare different national copyright laws). 
There are also works within this qualitative category focused on specific 
matters, such as copyright clearance (Ñusta Nina, Final Guidelines on Copyright 
Clearance and IPR Management (eContentplus, ECP-2007-DILI-517006, 
2010)), copyright limitations (Tatiana Brazhnik, How to Balance Interests: 
Comparative Legal Aspects on the Limitation of Copyright in International Law 
(National Research University Higher School of Economics, Working Paper No. 
WP BRP 41/LAW/2014, 2014)), linking and framing (Ignacio Garrote, Linking, 
Framing and Copyright: A Comparative Law Approach (2001)), peer-to-peer 
file-sharing and third party liability (Guy Pessach, An International-
Comparative Perspective on Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing and Third Party 
Liability in Copyright Law: Framing the Past, Present, and Next Generations’ 
Questions, 40 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1, 87–133 (2007) (analyzing Australia, 
Canada, and United States)), and video games (ANDY RAMOS, ET AL., THE 
LEGAL STATUS OF VIDEO GAMES: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN NATIONAL 
APPROACHES (2013) (analyzing 24 countries)). The International Comparative 
Legal Guide to Copyright 2015 edited by Sherrell includes the following 23 
jurisdictions: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, 
Philippines, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, and United States. The study on the legal status of video games 
prepared by Ramos, López, Rodríguez, Meng, and Abrams covers 24 countries: 
Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, 
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, South 
Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, and United States. 
 17 Loi n°2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la 
création sur internet [Law 2009-669 of June 12, 2009], LEGIFRANCE 
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000020735432&d
ateTexte=&categorieLien=id (promoting the distribution and protection of 
creative works on the Internet). 
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two times they were detected illegally sharing content through peer 
to peer (“P2P”) networks, and only when a third violation was 
identified was legal action taken. 18  Applying a difference-in-
difference approach to a panel of iTunes sales data from the four 
major music labels (Universal Music, Warner Music, EMI Music, 
and Sony Music) across a broad set of European countries, 
Danaher et al. found that “increased consumer awareness of 
HADOPI caused French iTunes music sales to increase by 22-
25%.”19 However, Arnold et al., using survey data from French 
Internet users, concluded that the HADOPI law did not have a 
substantial deterrent effect on individuals’ decision to engage in 
digital piracy for the first time.20 Instead, he argued that “the 
increased [iTunes sales in France were] likely to have been caused 
by public educational efforts and increased information about legal 
channels that coincided with the introduction of that law.” 21 
Similarly, Gavaldà-Miralles et al.22 analyzed a two-year-long user-
level trace of download activity of over 38,000 people from around 
                                                
 18 ACT TO PROMOTE THE DISSEMINATION AND PROTECTION OF CREATION ON 
THE INTERNET, http://www.senat.fr/dossier-legislatif/pjl07-405.html (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2016). 
 19 Brett Danaher, Michael D. Smith, Rahul Telang & Siwen Chen, The Effect 
of Graduated Response Anti-Piracy Laws on Music Sales: Evidence From an 
Event Study in France, 62 J. OF INDUS. ECON., 541, 541 (2014), 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joie.12056/pdf; but see Will Tovey, 
An Analysis of Claimed Relationships between iTunes Sales in France and 
Hadopi, LEGAL PIRACY, (2012),  
https://legalpiracy.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/hadopi-and-itunes1.pdf 
(expressing doubts about the reliability of the study when analyzing its 2012 
version due to its economic methodology and in the interpretation of its results). 
 20  Michael Arnold, Eric Darmon, Sylvain Dejean, & Thierry Penard, 
Graduated Response Policy and the Behavior of Digital Pirates: Evidence from 
the French Three-strike (Hadopi) Law, Univ. of Del. Alfred Lerner College of 
Business & Econ., Dept. of Econ., Working Paper No. 2014-07, at 4 (2014), 
http://www.lerner.udel.edu/sites/default/files/ECON/PDFs/RePEc/dlw/Working
Papers/2014/UDWP2014-07.pdf. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Arnau Gavaldà-Miralles, John S. Otto, Fabián E. Bustamante, Luis A.N. 
Amaral, Jordi Duch, & Roger Guimerà, User Behavior and Change: File-
sharers and Copyright Laws, PROC. OF THE 10TH ACM INT’L CONF. ON 
EMERGING NETWORKING EXPERIMENTS AND TECH., 319–324 (2014), 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2674005.2675009. 
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the world. One of their most interesting outcomes was that when 
the New Zealand “three-strikes” law took effect, the reduction in 
file-sharing activity of copyrighted content lasted only two 
months.23 After that initial period, digital piracy returned to the 
level observed prior to the law being enacted. 
Joining this more pessimistic view on how copyright laws can 
influence digital piracy, Orme analyzed the short- and long-term 
effectiveness of six major U.S. anti-piracy government actions on 
the box-office revenues of the motion-picture industry. 24  His 
results showed that, “with one notable exception [the NET Act],25 
these laws have either been ineffective or counter-productive from 
the perspective of the film studios.” 26  Thus, according to the 
author, those stricter policies designed to limit piracy actually 
decreased box-office revenue, perhaps because they 
unintentionally fostered an increase in the number of downloads of 
films.27 
However, again, there are other papers that seem more 
confident in the positive effects of copyright law (and related 
government and judicial policies) to reduce digital piracy: 
Bhattacharjee et al. found that the Recording Industry Association 
of America’s highly publicized lawsuits against P2P sharers 
significantly reduced the availability of pirated files.28 In addition, 
                                                
 23 COPYRIGHT AMENDMENT ACT 2011 (N.Z.) NEW ZEALAND LEGISLATION, 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2011/0011/latest/DLM3331813.html 
(last visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
 24 Tylor Orme, The Short- And Long-Term Effectiveness of Anti-Piracy Laws 
and Enforcement Actions, 38 J. OF CULTURAL ECON. 351, 354–356 (2014), 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10824-014-9225-2. 
 25 The United States No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105–147 
(enabling criminal prosecution of individuals who engage in copyright 
infringement, effective since December 16, 1997). 
 26 Orme supra note 24, at 367. 
 27 Id. (“[I]t appears that shutting down Web sites, seemingly the most direct 
method of reducing illegal access to copyrighted materials, does not have any 
noticeable impact on the revenues received by the US film industry.”). 
 28 Sudip Bhattacharjee, Ram D. Gopal, Kaveepan Lertwachara, James R. 
Marsden, & Rahul Telang, The Effect of Digital Sharing Technologies on Music 
Markets: A Survival Analysis of Albums on Ranking Charts, 53 MGMT. SCI., 
1359, 1374 (2007), 
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~rtelang/digital_sharing_MS.pdf. 
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McKenzie and Walls indicated that several Australian court cases 
significantly diminished the number of unlawful downloads of 
films.29 However, these authors focused on the media coverage 
devoted to cases involving copyright enforcement and effects in 
reducing digital piracy, instead of the specific relationship between 
the implementation of laws and the flow of illegal content online. 
Specifically regarding the role of the copyright enforcement, 
Varian provides a concise summary of this topic from an economic 
perspective.30 Such a theoretical law and economics approach to 
the relationship between digital piracy and copyright remedies—
and its legal enforcement—is also found in Margolis.31 Two pieces 
of conventional wisdom within this field are that most anti-piracy 
policies do not have a dramatic impact on actual downloads 
because of the unenforceable nature of much of online copyright 
law,32 and also that most anti-piracy strategies dilute over time 
because of evolving technologies for sharing files online.33 
In short, although the literature mostly agrees that legal 
enforcement drives copyright infringement downward, even with 
the difficulties of implementation, there is conflicting evidence 
regarding the effects of copyright law on digital piracy. This article 
will shed light on this issue by signaling which copyright law 
measures are more highly correlated to low/high digital piracy 
rates worldwide. 
                                                
 29 Jordi McKenzie & W. David Walls, File-Sharing and Film Revenues: An 
Empirical Analysis (University of Sydney, Economics Working Paper Series, 
2014), http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au//bitstream/2123/9271/1/ECON%202013-
14.pdf. 
 30 Hal R. Varian, Copying and Copyright, 19 J. OF ECON. PERSP., 121, 138 
(2005) https://www.amherst.edu/system/files/media/0657/VarianCopy.pdf. 
 31  STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, Law and Economics of Copyright Remedies, 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT, 241-263 (Richard Watt, ed., 
2014). 
 32 Brian P. Heneghan, The NET Act, Fair Use, and Willfulness-Is Congress 
Making a Scarecrow of the Law?, J. OF HIGH TECH. L., 1, 27, 46 (2002), 
https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-172599151.html. 
 33  Hasshi Sudler, Effectiveness of Anti-Piracy Technology: Finding 
Appropriate Solutions for Evolving Online Piracy, 56 BUS. HORIZONS, 149, 157 
(2002), www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0007681312001577. 
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B. Effects of Development Economics on Intellectual Property 
Infringement 
One of the basic ideas of this paper is that, along with or 
instead of copyright law mechanisms, there may be socioeconomic 
reasons (defined as control variables in the econometric 
specification) that also explain digital piracy rates. General works 
on development economics 34  have explored in depth the 
determinants that make countries rich or poor. Associated with this 
branch of knowledge, there is a growing interest in linking 
economic development with digital piracy rates. For instance, 
Karaganis states that “the first determinant of access to media 
markets is income. [Then,] the general assumption [is] that 
countries ‘grow’ themselves out of high piracy levels as the 
number of high-income consumers increases (and, 
correspondingly, as formal markets crowd out informal ones).”35 In 
other words, digital piracy is inversely correlated to wider 
measures of socioeconomic development: the richer the country, 
the lower its piracy rate. Multiple empirical research studies 
support this claim.36 It is thus even clearer that such socioeconomic 
indicators must be included as control variables for a dual purpose: 
                                                
 34 See, e.g., DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: 
THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012); Jared Diamond, 
What Makes Countries Rich or Poor?, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 
(June 7, 2012), www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/jun/07/what-makes-
countries-rich-or-poor; SATYA THALLAM, INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
INDEX (2008), http://www.libinst.ch/publikationen/LI-2008-IPRI-Report.pdf. 
 35  SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING 
ECONOMIES, 10 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011),  
http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/MPEE-PDF-
1.0.4.pdf; see also Varian supra note 30 at 124-125. 
 36 Andrew E. Burke, How Effective Are International Copyright Conventions 
In the Music Industry, 20 J. OF CULTURAL ECON., 51, 66 (1996), 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10824-005-1060-z; Trisha L. Bezmen 
& Craig A. Depken, II, Influences On Software Piracy: Evidence From the 
Various United States, 90 ECON. LETTERS, 356, 356-361 (2006), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01651765/90; Arnau Gavaldà-
Miralles, et al., Impact of Heterogeneity and Socioeconomic Factors on 
Individual Behavior in Decentralized Sharing Ecosystems, 111 PROC. OF THE 
NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI. OF THE U.S. OF AMERICA, 15322, 15327 (2006), 
http://www.pnas.org/content/111/43/15322. 
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to check whether those previous findings can actually be replicated 
in this study and to reduce the omitted variable bias and obtain a 
cleaner legislative effect on the piracy rate. Sections III.B.1 and .3 
explain in detail whether empirical results validate or refute that 
development economics theory.37 
C. Digital Piracy and Individual Choice 
As described above, there have been very few—and narrowly 
focused—studies empirically assessing the relation between 
copyright law and digital piracy, and many more academic works 
that have been published showing that piracy may hurt sales. The 
latter area is not within the scope of this article, but the literature 
states almost unanimously that copyright infringement has no 
positive effects on sales (they are either neutral or negative38).39 
                                                
 37 Complementing the development economics literature, another one of my 
key control variables targets the relationship between good, legal sources for 
online content (iTunes, Netflix, Spotify) and—decreasing—piracy rates. See 
Will Page, Adventures in the Netherlands: Spotify, Piracy and the New Dutch 
Experience, SPOTIFY (2013),  
https://press.spotify.com/us/2013/07/17/adventures-in-netherlands/ (describing 
how Spotify’s launch in the Netherlands in 2010 substantially decreased 
copyright infringement for music). 
 38 See Luis Aguiar & Bertin Martens, Digital Music Consumption on the 
Internet: Evidence from Clickstream Data, Digital Economy Working Paper 
2013/04 (Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, Joint Research Centre 
of the European Commission, Working Paper JRC79605 2013); Tin Cheuk 
Leung, Music Piracy: Bad for Record Sales but Good for the iPod? (Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, Working Paper 2012); Brett Danaher, Samita 
Dhanasobhon, Michael D. Smith, & Rahul Telang, Converting Pirates without 
Cannibalizing Purchasers: The Impact of Digital Distribution on Physical Sales 
and Internet Piracy, 29 MARKETING SCI., 1138, 1149-50 (2010); Brett Danaher, 
Michael D. Smith, & Rahul Telang, Piracy and Copyright Enforcement 
Mechanisms (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 
19150 2013); Arthur S. DeVany & W. David Walls, Estimating the Effects of 
Movie Piracy on Box-office Revenue, 30 REV. OF INDUS. ORG., 291, 299 (2007); 
Kai-Lung Hui & Ivan Png, Piracy and the Legitimate Demand for Recorded 
Music, 2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, Art. 11, 19 (2003); Stan 
J. Liebowitz, File-Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?, 49 
J. L. & ECON., 1, 21 (2006); Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High 
C’s: Music Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample 
of College Students, 49 J. L. & ECON., 29, 61 (2006); Alejandro Zentner, File 
Sharing and International Sales of Copyrighted Music: An Empirical Analysis 
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Nevertheless, it is also true that even though the substitutability40 
between a pirated and an original copy unambiguously harms the 
industry, there are other considerations at stake, such as the 
“sampling effect” 41  or the fact that copyright industries are 
producing more content than ever before.42 
In a much wider scope, which is not covered by this study, 
there is extensive literature on the debate regarding copyright 
regulations, piracy, and incentives toward creativity. Such general 
reflections on copyright will be addressed in this article through its 
three basic theoretical assumptions (discussed in Section II, 
infra).43 
                                                                                                         
with a Panel of Countries, 5 TOPICS IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, Art. 21 
(2005); Alejandro Zentner, Measuring the Effect of File Sharing on Music 
Purchases, 49 J. L. & ECON., 63 (2006). 
 39 But see Robert G. Hammond, Profit Leak? Pre-Release File Sharing and 
the Music Industry, 81 S. ECON. J., 387, 389 (2014) (showing that some 
individual artists may benefit from piracy); Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman 
Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 
115 J. OF POL. ECON., 1, 38-40 (2007) (finding a small positive effect between 
piracy and sales); and Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck, The Effect of Internet 
Piracy on Music Sales: Cross-Section Evidence, 1 REV. OF ECON. RES. ON 
COPYRIGHT ISSUES, 71, 78 (2004) (suggesting antithetical evidence about the 
magnitude of that causal relation). 
 40 In economics, when two products (such as pirated and original goods) are 
substitutes, they have a positive cross elasticity of demand, which measures how 
quantity demanded for a good changes with respect to variations in the price of 
another good. 
 41 Piracy could allow a consumer to discover new songs that then induce him 
or her to purchase the entire album or other songs from that artist, which 
otherwise might have not been bought. See Stan J. Liebowitz, File-Sharing: 
Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?, 49 J OF .L. & ECON., 1, 17-18 
(2006). 
 42 See MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, (Joe Karaganis ed. 2011), 
http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/MPEE-PDF-
1.0.4.pdf; Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y. L REV., 
460, 515 (2015) http://www.nyulawreview.org/issues/volume-90-number-2/ip-
world-without-scarcity. 
 43 For the sake of the avid reader though, see MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. 
LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008); Christian Handke, Plain 
Destruction or Creative Destruction? Copyright Erosion and the Evolution of 
the Record Industry, 3 REV. OF ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES, 29-51 
(2006); ROB VAN DER NOLL, ET AL., FLEXIBLE COPYRIGHT: THE LAW AND 
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Finally, although it is beyond the reach of this project, for the 
benefit of fullness, other interesting papers with empirical support 
relate either digital piracy or sales to digital rights management 
(“DRM”) technologies, 44  “poisoning” strategies, 45  digital 
                                                                                                         
ECONOMICS OF INTRODUCING AN OPEN NORM IN THE NETHERLANDS (2012); 
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEBATE. PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW, ECONOMICS 
AND POLITICAL ECONOMY (Meir Perez Pugatch ed. 2006), MATTHEW RIMMER, 
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSUMER REVOLUTION: HANDS OFF MY IPOD 
(2007) SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004), 
HANDBOOK ON THE DIGITAL CREATIVE ECONOMY (Ruth Towse & Christian 
Handke eds. 2013). Of course, from an American and European normative 
standpoint, it is essential to cite PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT 
(Aspen, New York, 3d ed. 2013); PAUL GOLDSTEIN & R. ANTHONY REESE, 
COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES: CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (7th ed. 2013); 
MARTIN PEITZ AND PATRICK WAELBROECK, The Effect of Internet Piracy on 
Music Sales: Cross-Section Evidence, 1-2 REV. OF ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT 
ISSUES 71-79 (2004); EDWARD ELGAR, CHELTENHAM COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: A COMMENTARY ON EU LEGAL INSTRUMENTS (Irini A. 
Stamatoudi & Paul Torremans eds. 2014); THE WITTEM PROJECT: EUROPEAN 
COPYRIGHT CODE (April 2010),  
http://www.copyrightcode.eu/Wittem_European_copyright_code_21%20april%
202010.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). There are also interesting papers mainly 
devoted to the future of copyright; GIUSEPPINA D’AGOSTINO, COPYRIGHT, 
CONTRACTS, CREATORS: NEW MEDIA, NEW RULES (2010), RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF EU COPYRIGHT (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham; 
Estelle Derclaye, eds. 2009), 1-6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW (Fiona 
Macmillan ed. 2005-2007), Ian Novos & Michael Waldman, Piracy of 
Intellectual Property: Past, Present, and Future, 10 REV. OF ECON. RES. ON 
COPYRIGHT ISSUES (2013). 
 44 See Rajiv K. Sinha, Fenando S. Machado, & Collin Sellman, Don’t Think 
Twice, It’s All Right: Music Piracy and Pricing in a DRM-Free Environment, 74 
J. OF MARKETING, 40-54 (2010); Dinah A. Vernik, Devavrat Purohit, & Preyas 
S. Desai, Music Downloads and the Flip Side of Digital Rights Management, 30 
MARKETING SCI., 1011, 1027 (2011). DRM is a group of technologies to control 
the use of digital content and devices after sale. Those authors argue that the use 
of DRM may increase piracy by making the content less usable for end-users. 
 45 See Nicholas Christin, Andreas S. Weigend, & John Chuang, Content 
Availability, Pollution, and Poisoning in File Sharing Peer-to-Peer Networks, 
PROC. OF THE 6TH ACM CONF. ON ELECTRONIC COM., 68-77 (2005), 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1064017. They found that file sharing 
“poisoning” strategies, that is placing a few intentional decoys of pirated 
content, can influence perceived availability of content in the networks. 
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distribution channels, 46  pricing policies, 47  or optimal copyright 
lengths.48 
III. METHODOLOGY 
An empirical law and economics methodology is deployed to 
answer this article’s research question—that is, “which copyright 
law measures are more related to low/high digital piracy rates?” It 
consists of a content analysis of significantly selected copyright 
law measures that have been more or less broadly implemented, or 
that have been dismissed, by the current national copyright statutes 
of 108 targeted countries (data from WIPO Lex). It represents a 
picture of how the world of copyright is today. Considering (1) the 
explanatory essence of the research question, (2) the data 
collection conducted (secondary analysis of extant datasets and 
content analysis of national copyright laws), (3) the number of 
countries considered, and (4) the quantitative data analysis, 
                                                
 46 See Brett Danaher, Samita Dhanasobhon, Michael D. Smith & Rahul 
Telang, Converting Pirates without Cannibalizing Purchasers: The Impact of 
Digital Distribution on Physical Sales and Internet Piracy, 29 MARKETING SCI., 
1138-1151 (2010) (reviewing iTunes distribution of TV content, sales of DVD 
box sets, and piracy levels); Barbara Deleersnyder, Inge Geyskens, Katrijn 
Gielens & Marnik G. Dekimpe, How Cannibalistic is the Internet Channel? A 
Study of the Newspaper Industry in the United Kingdom and The Netherlands, 
19 INT’L J. OF RES. IN MARKETING, 337-348 (2002) (digital news and sales 
physical newspapers); Yu Jeffrey Hu & Michael D. Smith, The Impact of Ebook 
Distribution on Print Sales: Analysis of a Natural Experiment (Carnegie Mellon 
University Working Paper 2013) (comparing sales of Kindle e-books and print 
books); Joel Waldfogel, Music File Sharing and Sales Displacement in the 
iTunes Era, 22 INFO. ECON. & POLICY, 306, 314 (2010) (analyzing YouTube 
viewing of television content and TV viewership levels). 
 47 See Ramnath K. Chellappa, Yuanyuan Chen & Sriram Venkataraman, An 
Empirical Examination of Global Software Piracy: Implications for Pricing and 
Policy, (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Yooki Park and Suzanne 
Scotchmer, Digital Rights Management and the Pricing of Digital Products, 
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES, (2005); Edward Elgar, Copying and the Pricing 
of Information Goods, HANDBOOK ON THE ECON. OF COPYRIGHT, 207-224 
(Richard Watt, ed. 2014). 
 48 See Nodir Adilov and Michael Waldman, Optimal Copyright Length and Ex 
Post Investment: A Mickey Mouse Approach, 51 ECON. INQUIRY, 1101-1122 
(2013); William M. Landes and Richard R. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable 
Copyright, 70 U. OF CHI. L. REV., 471-518 (2013). 
OCT 2016] Copyright Law and Digital Piracy 85 
econometric modeling is the only49 suitable research strategy for 
this paper. 
A. Theoretical Assumptions 
Three basic (and modest) theoretical assumptions drive the 
whole project: 
(1) Both very high and very low rates of digital piracy pose 
concerns for innovation, thus implying that some level of 
(effective) copyright regulation is required to incentivize the 
creation of original works. 
This research in no way seeks to create a regulatory copyright 
model that implies a 0% piracy rate: this is neither viable nor 
optimal, as trying to completely eliminate digital piracy would 
require extremely aggressive copyright protection measures that 
would probably reduce lawful market demand. This negative 
impact on demand would lower both the equilibrium price and 
quantity to suboptimal levels that would likely cause a deadweight 
loss of social welfare—and, in turn, of efficiency—due to the 
reduced size of the digital entertainment market.50 In other words, 
understanding that the demand for digital products is relatively 
elastic (i.e., there is a high substitution effect51), a minimum piracy 
rate must be accepted, as this maximizes the value of the 
authorized market. 
(2) In comparative terms, digital piracy rates are the best 
available indicator of the level of respect for copyright. 
(3) Inadequate national copyright laws are linked in part to 
high digital piracy rates, but there are, of course, other reasons that 
may explain that level of copyright infringement, such as collective 
values, business frameworks or legal enforcement. These latter 
elements are included as control variables in this econometric 
study. 
                                                
 49 There are simply no methodological alternatives that would allow such 
quantitative study apart from econometric modeling. 
 50 See DEADWEIGHT LOSS EXAMPLE, http://goo.gl/qWCliQ (last visited Sept. 
12, 2016). 
 51 For the music market see, e.g., Aguiar & Martens, supra note 38 at 16-17, 
Deadweight Loss Example, supra note 50, Leung, supra note 38 at 28. 
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B. Research Population and Sampling 
The research population of this article is the World Intellectual 
Property Organization’s member states—188 countries. 52  This 
group was narrowed down based on available data regarding 
national digital piracy from BSAs 2014 Global Software Survey.53 
Thus, the convenience sample54 used equaled 108 countries.55 The 
sample countries were divided into the following categories: 
· Central and Eastern Europe and Central and Western Asia 
(24): Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
                                                
 52  See World Intellectual Property Organization, Member States, 
http://www.wipo.int/members/en (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
 53 BSA Global Software Survey, supra note 13. 
 54 This study relies on a “convenience sample” because, within the research 
population, the selection of its units of analysis (108 countries) was based on a 
non-random criterion, i.e., availability of national digital piracy rates. 
 55 The sample size is large enough to estimate the unknown parameters with 
precision. The sample does not include the most part of Africa, some Asian 
countries, the European microstates, the Caribbean, and the islands in the Indian 
Ocean and Oceania. Taiwan is not included either because the World Bank has 
no data available on the desired control variables. Hong Kong, although it is not 
a member of the WIPO, is part of the sample because there are reliable data for 
it. Specifically the eighty WIPO member states for which there are no data 
regarding digital piracy are: 
· Africa (33): Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, and 
Tanzania. 
· Asia (15): Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, 
Lao, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan. 
· Caribbean (15): Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
· European microstates (5): Andorra, Holy See, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San 
Marino. 
· Indian Ocean islands (4): Comoros, Madagascar, Maldives, and Seychelles. 
· Oceania islands (8): Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. 
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Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. 
· Latin America (18): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
· Middle East and Africa (27): Algeria, Bahrain, Botswana, 
Cameroon, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, Turkey, 
United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
· North America and Western Europe (22): Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
and United States. 
· South and East Asia, and Pacific (17): Australia, 
Bangladesh, Brunei, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South 
Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
One important warning has to be made regarding the sample. 
Whereas the study’s results will obviously be applicable to the 
selected countries (internal validity) because the project has been 
designed to minimize systematic error, it is difficult to say that the 
research will also have external validity because of the 
convenience sampling. However, this is not especially troubling 
because the excluded WIPO’s member states are not of central 
interest in comparative legal studies regarding intellectual 
property. These states include most of Africa, some Asian 
countries, the European microstates, the Caribbean, and the islands 
in the Indian Ocean and Oceania. 
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C. Variables: Selection and Coding 
1. Dependent Variable (Piracy Rates) and the BSA Global 
Software Survey: Relevance, Generalization, and Limitations 
The dependent variable 𝑌! (computer software piracy rate of 
country i) is based on the 2014 BSA Global Software Survey.56 At 
the time this article was written between 2014 and 2015, this was 
the most recent and thorough comparative study on digital piracy 
to date, and its outcomes continue to be applicable to 2016.57 
Although the survey focuses on computer software, this type of 
copyright infringement is a very good approximation of the overall 
level of piracy in the country. One can assume that software piracy 
rates can be suggestively extrapolated to general piracy figures 
because there is association between copyright infringements for 
all sorts of digital goods (software, films, music, literature, video 
games): 
“[G]iven the relatively uniform global pricing for most media 
goods, a loose correlation is not surprising: the first determinant of 
access to media markets is income. Nor is the general assumption 
that countries ‘grow’ themselves out of high piracy levels as the 
number of high-income consumers increases (and, 
correspondingly, as formal markets crowd out informal ones).”58 
                                                
 56 BSA Global Software Survey, supra note 13. 
 57 The 2014 BSA Global Software Survey was issued in June 2014 and was 
based on 2013 data regarding unlicensed software installation. On May 25, 
2016, the Software Alliance released the 11th edition of its survey based on 
2015 data: BSA Global Software Survey 2016: Seizing Opportunity Through 
License Compliance, BSA, THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE,  
http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2016/downloads/studies/BSA_GSS_US.pdf. Between 
2013 and 2015, there has been no change or a raw decrease of 1-2% in the 
software piracy rate for 91 of the 108 countries examined in this paper, with the 
exceptions of Bulgaria, Poland, South Korea, and Vietnam (-3%); China, Latvia, 
Moldova, and Sri Lanka (-4%); Estonia (-5%); Georgia (-6%); Bahrain, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Honduras, and Libya (+1%); and 
Russia (+2%). These are all small and consistent differences across nations that 
maintain the validity of the article’s results. 
 58 MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, 10 (Joe Karaganis ed. 2011), 
http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/MPEE-PDF-
1.0.4.pdf.  
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Namely, all forms of digital piracy are, to some extent, 
associated because they are inversely correlated to wider measures 
of socioeconomic development—the richer the country, the lower 
its piracy rate.59 For this reason, the econometric model includes 
several economic control variables. Furthermore, it should be 
understood that there are no databases on piracy in other sorts of 
digital entertainment products that are truly comparable between 
states. However, because the BSA is an organization of pro-
copyright companies,60 it is likely to find overestimation in the 
BSA study’s national digital piracy rates.61 Nevertheless, even if 
bias is revealed, it does not jeopardize the validity of the work 
because the absolute rate of digital piracy in one country is not 
relevant here. What is essential for this comparative study is that 
the BSA used the same methodology to calculate digital piracy 
                                                
 59 See Acemoglu and Robinson; Diamond; and Thallam, supra note 34; see 
also Varian, supra note 30. 
 60  The Software Alliance, BSA Global & Global Policy Members, 
http://www.bsa.org/about-bsa/bsa-members (last visited September 12, 2016). 
Members of the Software Alliance include: Adobe, Altium, ANSYS, Apple, 
Autodesk, Bentley Systems, CA Technologies, CNC Software – Mastercam, 
Dell, IBM, Intel, Intuit, Microsoft, Minitab, Oracle, PTC, Rockwell Automation, 
Rosetta Stone, Salesforce.com, Siemens, Symantec, Tekla, The MathWorks, and 
Trend Micro. 
 61 See Karaganis, supra note 58 at 11, “Our reservations about measurement 
extend to the BSA’s comparatively robust model of ‘rates’ of piracy, which 
underpins the organization’s very precise claims about changes in levels of 
piracy from one year to the next. The BSA studies rely on the relatively small 
and stable (and therefore predictable) number of packaged software applications 
installed on an average computer –what it calls ‘average software load’, or ASL. 
ASL allows the BSA to estimate the total installed software base in a country 
and to compare that number to legal sales. The difference between the two is 
attributed to piracy. The model has no counterpart in music or film, where the 
size of personal libraries is subject to huge and growing variation. While solid in 
principle, however, the model is still very dependent on complicated inputs that 
the BSA’s research vendor, the IDC [“International Data Corporation”], does 
not share. Conflicting estimates of the size of retail markets, for example, are 
relatively common outside the United States and Europe, as is difficulty in 
establishing how many computers are in use in different countries. In the case of 
Russia, for example, where the BSA prominently cites a 16% decrease in the 
piracy rate between 2005 and 2009 as evidence of effective enforcement 
strategies, we were unable to independently reproduce those inputs.” 
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rates for all the countries, granting that the relative relations 
between them remain constant.62 
2. Independent Variables (Copyright Law Measures), 
Replicability, and Aggregated Variable 
The independent variables 𝑋  of this article’s econometric 
model are copyright law measures that have been selected 
according to two criteria: (1) they have the closest relationship 
with immediate or proximate incentives toward digital piracy; and 
(2) they have substantial variance across countries. Consider that 
the relatively limited number of chosen independent variables 
allow (a) increased sample size, (b) increased number of degrees of 
freedom, 63  (c) gain variance, 64  and (d) limit/avoid 
multicollinearity.65 Almost all copyright statutes share the same 
                                                
 62 The 2014 BSA study computes unlicensed software rates as the division 
between unlicensed software units and total software units installed. The total 
software units installed results from the multiplication of the number of PCs 
getting software by the software units per PC (licensed and unlicensed). The two 
sources of data that filled in the previous calculations were (1) a survey 
conducted by the International Data Corporation (“IDC”)—a provider of market 
statistics headquartered in Massachusetts—in early 2014 and (2) quarterly 
research products called “PC Trackers” used by the IDC. The survey was 
conducted online or by phone and covered (a) 22,000 home and enterprise PC 
users in 34 markets and (b) 2,020 IT managers in 20 countries. IDC’s PC 
Trackers reach 86 countries, and the rest of nations included in the Software 
Alliance report were assessed through custom assignments. The software 
examined in the BSA study comprises only PCs, including desktops, laptops, 
and netbooks, but not tablets, smartphones or software that runs on servers. It 
accounts for operating systems, systems software (e.g., databases and security 
packages), business applications, consumer applications (e.g., games, personal 
finance software, and cloud computing services), software-as-a-service (SaaS), 
platform-as-a-service (“PaaS”), and software sold as part of legalization 
programs (e.g., bulk sales for a government to distribute to schools), BSA 
Global Software Survey, supra note 13 at 11-12. 
 63 In statistics, degrees of freedom are the number of independently variable 
factors affecting the estimate of a statistical parameter that are free to vary. 
 64 In statistics, the variance (usually 𝜎! or Var(X)) is the expectation of the 
squared standard deviation of a random variable from its mean. In other words, 
it measures how far a set of numbers is with respect to its mean. 
 65 In statistics, multicollinearity happens when two or more independent 
variables in a multiple regression are highly correlated, meaning that it is 
increasingly difficult to compute the coefficient estimates of the regression or 
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legal patterns or institutions including, subject matter, 
authorship/ownership, terms of protection, economic and moral 
rights, limitations on exclusive rights, and enforcement.66 Thus, the 
selection of independent variables was made after assessing all the 
common legal categories to, therefore, identify the variables that 
(i) act as incentives now toward digital piracy and (ii) provide 
variance. For instance, copyright terms or the possibility of 
termination of transfers and licenses granted by the author67 take 
place thirty or more years in the future and, hence, do not have 
immediate or proximate effects on the decision of unlawfully 
downloading copyrighted content today. In contrast, the exclusive 
rights to reproduce copyrighted works, to prepare derivative works 
or to distribute copies are very similar across countries, such that 
they do not have enough variance to be included as independent 
variables. 
All national copyright laws can be found in English on the 
WIPO Lex database. 68  This article deals only with statutes; 
exclusively in some common law countries,69 court rulings were 
considered but only to validate the statutory analysis—hence, court 
opinions were not systematically coded. International treaties were 
not added,70 although most of their content is already included in 
national legislations.71 
                                                                                                         
how such individual predictors affect the outcome/dependent variable. For 
instance, with perfect multicollinearity, the ordinary least-squares estimator 
cannot be calculated. 
 66  See PAUL GOLDSTEIN AND MARKETA TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2012); Edwin 
Komen, Theodore Max, USA Copyright 2016, INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL GUIDE TO COPYRIGHT (2d ed. 2016),  
http://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/copyright/copyright-2016/usa. 
 67 Time limit set for the allocation of the copyright, after which it will return 
to the artist. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (1976). 
 68 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 12. 
 69 This paper complements the content analysis for common law countries on 
national copyright acts with court rulings: Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, 
New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States. 
 70 The 1886 Berne Convention (Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works), the 1961 Rome Convention (Rome Convention for 
the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organizations), the 1974 Brussels Convention (Brussels Convention Relating to 
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Therefore, seven binary and seven categorical variables were 
selected and distributed across the following six groups: 
1. Subject matter of copyright:72 
1.a. Sweat of the brow doctrine 73  (Does an author gain 
copyright protection through simple diligence, effort, and expense 
during the creation of a work, such as a database, or a directory? In 
such case, it means that substantial creativity or “originality” is not 
required.) (binary).74 [“sweatbrow”]75 
                                                                                                         
the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite), the 
1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, the 1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty, other WIPO-administered treaties, the 1952 UNESCO Universal 
Copyright Convention, and the 1994 TRIPS Agreements, among others. 
 71 See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works (1986), World Intellectual Property Organization (setting only minimum 
standards for the signatory parties). 
 72 Generally, the subject matter of copyright refers to the types of works that 
are protected by copyright laws, such as literary, musical, dramatic, 
choreographic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, audiovisual, and architectural 
works. In the United States, it covers “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they 
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device.” Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) 
(2012). Moreover, “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work 
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is 
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) 
(2012). 
 73 In the United States, the sweat of the brow doctrine was once understood 
for the proposition “that an original arrangement of opinions is copyrightable 
whenever it is the product of labor, talent, or judgment.” West Publishing Co. v. 
Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
1070 (1987) (citing Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 32 L.Ed. 547, 9 S.Ct. 177 
(1888). Contra Feist Pub’l, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 US 340 (1991) 
(establishing that information alone without a minimum of original creativity 
may not be protected by copyright, and thus rejecting the application of the 
sweat of the brow doctrine to U.S. copyright law). 
 74 Binary variables are computed as 0 or 1. For more details, refer to coding 
outcomes provided in Appendix. 
 75 The descriptors in brackets define the independent and control variables 
shown in the tables and figures below. 
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1.b. Is computer software considered a literary work? 
(binary).76 [“softlitwork”] 
2. Authorship and ownership:77 
2.a. Work-for-hire provisions (binary).78 [“workforhire”] 
2.b. Provision of solutions to copyright clarification problems 
in collective and orphan works (structural market failure),79 such as 
one-stop shops and voluntary public registers (binary). 80 
[“collorphanworks”] 
                                                
 76 See generally WIPO Copyright Treaty, Art. 4, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 105-17. (“Computer programs are protected as literary works within 
the meaning of Article 2 of the Berne Convention.”). See also Andy Ramos, 
Laura López, Anxo Rodríguez, Tim Meng, & Stan Abrams, The Legal Status of 
Video Games: Comparative Analysis in National Approaches, WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (2013),  
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/activities/pdf/comparative_
analysis_on_video_games.pdf, (comparing legal and copyright status of video 
games among countries). 
 77  In the United States, ownership of copyright protected by the U.S. 
Copyright Act “vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors 
of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the work.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) 
(2012). 
 78 See generally CORY DOCTOROW, INFORMATION DOESN’T WANT TO BE 
FREE: LAWS FOR THE INTERNET AGE, (2014) (discussing the tensions between 
copyright laws in the digital age and small artists’ ability to earn money from 
their works). 
 79 ”An ‘orphan work’ [is] any original work of authorship for which a good 
faith prospective user cannot readily identify and/or locate the copyright 
owner(s) in a situation where permission from the copyright owner(s) is 
necessary as a matter of law.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN 
WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION (2015) at 9,  
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/reports/orphan-works2015.pdf. 
 80 See generally Directive 2012/28/EU, of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 25 Oct. 12 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, O. J. (L 
299), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012L0028&from=EN (showing the 
European Union Directive’s approach allowed uses of orphaned works); Final 
Guidelines on Copyright Clearance and IPR Management, Art. 2.2, EUROPEAN 
FILM GATEWAY ECP-2007-DILI-517006 (2010),  
http://www.efgproject.eu/downloads/D_5_3_Final_Guidelines_Copyright_Clear
ance_online.pdf (defining and discussing proper use and attribution of orphan 
works); Directive of the European Parliament of 24 May 2011 on certain 
permitted uses of orphan works (COM [2011] 289 final), 
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3. Exclusive rights:81 
3.a. Scope of performance and display rights (whether they 
encompass digital technology, which is very relevant in a world 
dominated by streaming and cloud services) (discrete 
categorization 0-3). [“performdisplay”] 
3.b. Secondary liability for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
and safe harbors (discrete categorization 0-3).82 [“secliabilityisp”] 
3.c. Scope of moral rights (discrete categorization 0-3). 
[“moralrights”] 
4. Rights management: 
4.a. Provisions on compulsory licenses (binary). 
[“compulsorylicenses”] 
4.b. Regulation and powers of copyright collecting agencies 
(collective licensing) (discrete categorization 0-3). 83 
[“collectingagencies”] 
                                                                                                         
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/businesses/intellectual_
property/mi0084_en.htm (proposing new uses of orphaned works). 
 81 In the United States, and subject to certain limitations, the owner of 
copyright has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize the reproduction and 
distribution of the copyrighted work, the preparation of derivative works and, if 
applicable, the public performance and display of the copyrighted work. 17 
U.S.C. § 106 (2) (2010). 
 82 In the United States, the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act added 
§ 512 to the 1976 Copyright Act to provide substantial immunity from copyright 
liability to ISPs if they are within one of these five safe harbors: (1) transitory 
digital network communications, (2) system caching, (3) information storage, 
(4) information location tools, and (5) service provision by nonprofit educational 
institutions. Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Pub. L. 
No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877-81 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512). 
Consider that this article uses the broad definition of Internet Service Provider or 
Internet intermediary, which includes the typical ISP companies (like AT&T), 
but also cable companies, Internet portals (eBay, Facebook), software and 
games providers, interactive forums, news aggregators, web search engines, and 
chats rooms. Of course, this accounts as well for (a) direct download websites 
(MEGA, RapidShare) and streaming websites (Dailymotion, Vimeo, YouTube), 
(b) peer-to-peer exchange programs (MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 913 (2005), µTorrent, eMule), and (c) websites with magnet links (The 
Pirate Bay, (https://thepiratebay.org/) and embedded videos. 
 83  See, e.g., INT’ CONFED OF AUTHORS & COMPOSERS (CISAC), 
http://www.cisac.org/What-We-Do (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
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5. Limitations on exclusive rights:84 
5.a. Possibility of private copying (and existence of private 
copying levy) (discrete categorization 0-3). [“private copying”] 
5.b. Provisions on the fair use doctrine, the fair dealing 
doctrine, and similar concepts (discrete categorization 0-3). 85 
[“fairuse”] 
5.c. Provisions on the first sale doctrine or exhaustion of rights 
(binary).86 [“firstsale”] 
6. Remedies87 and public domain88: 
                                                
 84 The U.S. Copyright Act provides a number of limitations on exclusive 
rights. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2010) (fair use); id. § 108 (reproductions by 
libraries and archives); id. § 109 (transfer by the owner of a particular copy); id. 
§ 110 (some performances and display for education or religious purposes); id. 
§ 111 (some cable broadcast transmissions); id. § 112 (ephemeral recordings 
made and retained by broadcasters); id. § 117 (additional copy or adaptation by 
the owner of a copy of a computer program as an essential step in its utilization, 
for archival purposes or for machine maintenance and repair); id. § 119 (some 
secondary transmissions of distant television programming by satellite); id. 
§ 121 (reproduction and distribution of copies or phonorecords of previously 
published, nondramatic literary work for blind or other people with disabilities); 
id. § 122 (some secondary transmissions of local television programming by 
satellite). 
 85 The fair use doctrine exempts from copyright infringement liability the 
reproduction or other usage of copyrighted material “for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2010). 
 86 ”Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 (3) [distribution right], the 
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any 
person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or 
phonorecord.” 17 U.S.C. § 109 (a) (2010). This limitation on the copyright 
holders’ exclusive right of distribution is known as the first sale doctrine—or 
exhaustion of rights principle in Europe—and it allows the owner of a physical 
copy of a work to legally resell it without obtaining permission of the copyright 
owner. 
 87  See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-513 (2010) (setting out scheme for 
copyright infringement remedies). 
 88 In copyright, works in the public domain are those whose exclusive rights 
have expired, have been forfeited or are inapplicable. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, 
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (Yale University 
Press, New Haven) (2008), http://thepublicdomain.org/thepublicdomain1.pdf. 
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6.a. Remedies for copyright infringement, including civil, 
criminal, and administrative consequences (discrete categorization 
0-3). [“remedies”] 
6.b. Legal forecast of copyleft89 schemes (the voluntary public 
domain is a possibility within the scope of Creative Commons and 
the GNU General Public License) (binary). [“copyleft”] 
The previous legislative measures (qualitative in nature), which 
act as independent variables, were formalized—i.e., coded as 
quantitative data—to meet the requirements of any econometric 
model.90 Bear in mind that the categorization of variables, as is 
unavoidable in economics and econometrics, is a simplification of 
the reality: the study loses qualitative detail to gain statistical 
evidence, which is a trade-off that must be accepted. Although 
binary variables are easy to code, independent variables based on 
the 0-3 discrete categorization are trickier. The rule of thumb 
behind it91 is that 0 indicates that there is no provision with respect 
to that copyright law measure, and 1, 2, and 3 mean that a country 
has such a provision with a small, medium or large scope, 
respectively. For instance, in the variable “remedies for copyright 
infringement” (6.a), 0 means no legal consequences for violating 
copyright, (1) lenient consequences, (2) neither lenient nor harsh 
consequences, and (3) harsh consequences. 
The coding scheme developed for this paper achieved a high 
degree of replicability, which is essential to increase the reliability 
of its conclusions. It was shared with a Professor of Copyright Law 
at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, and with a J.D. student at 
Stanford Law School. They were asked to code both the U.S. and 
                                                
 89 “Copyleft is a general method for making a [work] free, and requiring all 
modified and extended versions of the [work] to be free as well.” GNU 
Operating System, WHAT IS COPYLEFT?, https://www.gnu.org/copyleft/ (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
 90 Natural language cannot be indeed processed through econometric tools 
and, therefore, the selected national legislative measures were quantitatively 
coded. 
 91 For the categorization of all independent variables, objective standards used 
were taken from secondary authorities, see GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra 
note 43 at 1:2-26, Sherrell, supra note 16, Ulmer and Schricker, supra note 16 at 
chapters 3 and 5. 
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the Spanish Copyright Act according to the protocol, with the 
following results: 
 
TABLE 1. REPLICABILITY TEST RESULTS 





100% in binary variables (7/7) 
86% in categorical variables (6/7) 
100% in binary variables (7/7) 
100% in categorical variables (7/7) 
J.D. student at 
Stanford Law 
School 
100% in binary variables (7/7) 
86% in categorical variables (6/7) 
100% in binary variables (7/7) 
86% in categorical variables (6/7) 
 
Thus, although quite accurate, the coding scheme obviously 
still has room for improvement, especially regarding categorical 
variables. Thus, the coding outcomes are already publicly available 
(see Appendix) to refine them following a process of online 
crowdsourcing. 
At the end of the coding process, an aggregated independent 
variable [“aggregated”] was also generated for each national 
copyright statute, which accounts for its global level of copyright 
optimism/pessimism92 or, in other words, whether that act is more 
pro-copyright holder or rather more pro-consumer/pro-free access. 
This provides the big picture of each copyright statute. The 
formula for computing such an aggregated figure consists in a 
weighted mean of all independent variables (subtracting half of 
their value to the categorical ones to equal them to the binary 
                                                
 92 See generally Paul Goldstein, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG 
TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 10–16 (2003) (describing the copyright debate 
between people who “view copyright’s cup of entitlement as always half full, 
only waiting to be filled still further [optimists]” and people who “see 
copyright’s cup as half empty: they accept that copyright owners should get 
some measure of control over copies as an incentive to produce creative works, 
but they would like copyright to extend only as far as is necessary to give this 
incentive, and treat anything more as an encroachment on the general freedom 
of everyone to write and say what they please [pessimists].”), id. at 11. 
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measures) and applying + or – to each variable depending, 
respectively, on whether it aims to increase authors’ protection or 
to give more freedom to consumers (see Appendix for more 
details). Finally, the results are converted to their absolute values 
and logarithmically normalized: a result closer to 1 means that, in 
general, the copyright statute is more pro-copyright holder, 
whereas numbers near 0 imply more pro-consumer regulations in 
that country. 
3. Control Variables 
Other important factors that may affect digital piracy were 
included as controls W in this econometric model to obtain a more 
exact relationship of legal measures on piracy rate in order to 
reduce any bias due to omitted variables. Control variables 
included:93 
1. Economics: 
1.a. GDP per capita (current US$). [“gdpcapita”] 
1.b. Gini index.94 [“gini”] 
1.c. Unemployment (% of total labor force) (modeled 
International Labor Organization estimate). [“unemployment”] 
2. Technology: 
2.a. Internet users (per 100 people). [“internetusers”] 
2.b. Annual per capita spending on legitimate digital goods.* 95 
[“spendinglegitdiggoods”] 
                                                
 93 WORLD BANK OPEN DATA, http://data.worldbank.org (last visited Sept. 12, 
2016). All data for this section are from the World Bank, except for those 
variables marked with “*”. Note that, although these variables are used as 
controls because of the nature of my research question, econometrics also allows 
the treatment of them as independent variables. This is especially important for 
controls such as the ones related to GDP, business models, sociocultural values, 
and judicial enforcement. 
 94 The Gini index or coefficient represents the income distribution of a 
nation’s residents and is the most commonly used measure of inequality. “[A] 
Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect 
inequality.” GINI Index (World Bank Estimate), THE WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?end=2013&start=2013&view
=map&year=2013 (Click “Details” on interactive chart for definition) (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
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2.c. Presence of business models adapted to the “digital 
economy” 96  (Spotify Premium, Netflix, and iTunes).* 97 
[“businessmodels”] 
2.d. Research and development expenditure (% of GDP). 
[“researchdevexp”] 
3. Others (geography, demographics, social attitudes, and 
legal system): 
3.a. Region 
3.b. Adult literacy rate (% of people aged 15 and above). 
[“adultliteracy”] 
3.c. Population aged 65 and above (%).98 [“oldpopulation”] 
                                                                                                         
 95 This variable is generated from the national “Commercial Value of Properly 
Licensed Software 2011” of the BSA’s Global Software Piracy Study, published 
in BSA, THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE (2013), Competitive Advantage: The 
Economic Impact of Properly Licensed Software, 10–14,  
http://portal.bsa.org/insead/assets/studies/2013softwarevaluestudy_en.pdf. 
 96 See DON TAPSCOTT , THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: PROMISE AND PERIL IN THE 
AGE OF NETWORKED INTELLIGENCE (1997). 
 97  See Sophie Curtis, Spotify and Netflix Curb Music and Film Piracy, 
TELEGRAPH (July 18, 2013, 9:57 AM),  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/10187400/Spotify-and-Netflix-
curb-music-and-film-piracy.html (demonstrating that piracy rates decrease as 
good, legal sources for online content increase); Stuart Dredge, Is Streaming 
Music Cannibalising Piracy? Spotify Dutch Study Says ‘Ja’, MUSIC ALLY (July 
17, 2013), http://musically.com/2013/07/17/is-streaming-cannibalising-piracy-
spotify-dutch-study-says-ja; Will Page, ADVENTURES IN THE NETHERLANDS: 
SPOTIFY, PIRACY AND THE NEW DUTCH EXPERIENCE 1 (2013), 
https://spotify.box.com/shared/static/nbktls3leeb0rcyh41sr.pdf; Glyn Moody, 
Yet More Evidence That Offering Good Legal Alternatives Reduces Music 
Piracy, TECHDIRT.COM (Sept. 10, 2014, 12:25 PM),  
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140910/09064428480/yet-more-evidence-
that-offering-good-legal-alternatives-reduces-music-piracy.shtml; Matt 
Schruers, Variety Covers Internet Disintermediation; Producer Says ‘Get Off 
My Lawn’, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT (Aug. 5, 2014),  
http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/080514-variety-covers-
disintermediation-producer-says-get-off-my-lawn. See also INTERNET POLICY 
TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, 
CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 77-78 (July 2013), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper
.pdf. 
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3.d. Pro-copyright social norms.*99 [“procopsocialnorms”] 
3.e. Presence of the Pirate Party (binary).* [“pirateparty”] 
3.f.  Level of judicial enforcement for copyright 
infringement.*100 [“enforcement”] 
                                                                                                         
 98 This variable is included to account for the fact that an older population 
affects—by decreasing—the digital piracy rate. See infra note 107. 
 99 The best available proxies to account for pro-copyright social norms are 
related to indices on ethics, corruption, and crime. Thus, this variable was 
created using the mean of the following concepts: (a) the six dimensions of 
national culture by GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING 
VALUES, BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 
(2d. 2001); GEERT HOFSTEDE, GERT JAN HOFSTEDE & MICHAEL MINKOV, 
CULTURES AND ORGANIZATIONS: SOFTWARE OF THE MIND (3d. 2010); see also 
Bryan W. Husted, The Impact of National Culture on Software Piracy, 26 J. OF 
BUS. ETHICS, 197, 201 (2000) (explaining certain cultural values (“power 
distance,” “individualism versus collectivism,” masculinity versus femininity,” 
“uncertainty avoidance,” “pragmatic versus normative”—formerly known as 
“long-term orientation versus short-term normative orientation”—, and 
“indulgence versus restrain” may affect software piracy)); (b) “Ethics and 
corruption” see Klaus Schwab, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM Global 
Competitiveness Report 2014–2015, http://reports.weforum.org/global-
competitiveness-report-2014-2015); (c) “Freedom from Corruption” see TERRY 
MILLER ET AL., HERITAGE FOUNDATION 2014 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 4-
9 (2014), http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2014/book/index_2014.pdf; and (d) 
“Absence of Corruption” and “Absence of Crime” see World Justice Project 
Rule of Law Index, 179, 182 (2014),  
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/files/wjp_rule_of_law_index_20
14_report.pdf. 
 100 This variable is included to capture the idea that “the same law” can be 
applied very differently depending on its enforcement. The degree to which a 
law is enforced directly affects the cost-benefit analysis for individuals: a low 
degree of enforcement decreased the probability of being punished, which 
means less cost for the individual and more unlawful conduct. The factor used 
here is a mean mix of four variables from three different international studies. 
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2014–2015 
407 (Klaus Schwab ed., 2014),  
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-
15.pdf (“1.02 Intellectual property protection”); TERRY MILLER, ET AL., THE 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 2014 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 471–72 (The 
Heritage Foundation ed., 2013),  
http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2014/book/index_2014.pdf  
(“Property Rights”); THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2014 
165–166 (The World Justice Project ed., 2014),  
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics analysis is not a key component of 
this paper because it only provides a few broad brushstrokes of 
what this study actually covers. However, some results deserve 
attention (the full table is in the Appendix, with emphasis on the 
most relevant data points). 
First, the average digital piracy rate worldwide is 58.36%, 
which is not nuanced enough, especially if we consider the 
likelihood of overestimation in the BSA’s study. This concern will 
be overcome in the next section on multivariate analysis. 
Of the sample countries, 76% consider software a literary 
work. This high figure is likely due to the Berne Convention, 
which was designed to better protect authors. 75% of the sampled 
countries apply the first sale doctrine, a pro-consumer measure, 
which allows second-hand markets for physical goods. 
Moreover, the scope of the performance and display rights, the 
moral rights, and the copyright remedies are very high. All three 
are essential to provide more protection to copyright holders. It is 
thus a way to see how, in general, copyright statutes are highly 
influenced by lobbies from the entertainment industry. 
Finally, some demographic data: 56% of the individuals in the 
sample countries have Internet access. Moreover each individual 
spends $28.45/year on legal purchases of digital goods. We also 
observe neither high nor low values for business models, pro-
copyright social norms, enforcement for IP infringement, and 
presence of the Pirate Party. The relevance of these variables will 
be better framed in the following pages. 
B. Multivariate Analysis 
As the research question shows, this study exclusively accounts 
for correlations between copyright law measures—as well as 
control variables—and digital piracy rates; it does not try to assess 
                                                                                                         
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/files/wjp_rule_of_law_index_20
14_report.pdf (“6.1. Effective regulatory enforcement” and “7.6 Effective civil 
justice enforcement”). 
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causal effects because, under its current approach, it would 
encounter the so-called identification problem.101 
Before getting into the findings, it is important to understand 
that there are two competing models regarding piracy and 
copyright regulations. The first one supports an inverse 
relationship between them (i.e., more copyright protection, less 
piracy—or equally, less copyright protection, more piracy). The 
second one defends a direct relationship between those two 
variables (i.e., less copyright protection, less piracy—or equally, 
more copyright protection, more piracy). When referring to 
“intuitive” results below (that is, the expected behavior of the 
variables), it is under the assumption defended by the direct 
relationship model. 
1. Correlation Analysis 
To know what copyright law measures and/or control variables 
are more related to high/low digital piracy rates, correlation 
analyses were conducted: 
	  
                                                
 101 The identification problem consists of not being able to say what reduced 
form coefficients of a model are compatible with each specific structural 
coefficients. For example, we cannot know whether a low/high digital piracy 
rate would be caused by a more/less expansive fair use doctrine, and/or more 
lenient/harsher provisions on remedies for copyright infringement, and/or the 
legal forecast of copyleft schemes. To solve the identification issue, the 
methodology used in this article would need to be changed and, for instance, 
adopt a quasi-experimental perspective. However, the global cross-national 
purpose of this study is not suitable for a quasi-experimental strategy, though 
future versions of this paper will likely incorporate this approach. Further 
developments of this study may also encompass panel data to assess causal 
relationships. Thus, the author may combine the cross-sectional data of this 
paper (current situation of 108 jurisdictions) with time series data, that is 
analyzing digital piracy rates, legislative changes, and control variables for the 
last X years in all the sample countries. 
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TABLE 2. CORRELATION ANALYSIS102 
 
 
Looking first at the correlations between the digital piracy rate 
and independent variables, at least three key results arise: 
(1) As intuitively expected, the presence of the sweat of the 
brow doctrine and a larger scope of secondary liability rules for 
ISPs are related to high levels of piracy. 
Regarding the sweat of the brow, when an author gains rights 
through simple diligence during the creation of a work (thus, 
substantial creativity or “originality” is not required), more (not 
very sensitive) material (databases, directories) becomes 
copyrighted and hence incentives to infringe increase. In this 
regard, remember Justice O’Connor’s excerpt from the Feist case 
quoted in the introduction. This fundamental opinion in the U.S. 
copyright history rejected the sweat of the brow doctrine, which 
                                                
 102 Table 2 shows the correlation between independent/control variables and 
digital piracy rates, considering all 108 jurisdictions in the sample. When the 
result is positive (dark blue bar), that variable and digital piracy react in the 
same way (e.g., more expansive rules on secondary liability for ISPs relates to 
higher piracy rates). In turn, when the result is negative (red bar), that variable 
and digital piracy are inversely associated (e.g., broader rules on fair use are 
correlated with lower piracy rates). For negative correlation results, Table 2 
includes red, yellow, and green dots to ease visual perception of relatively low, 
medium, and high inverse associations. The colored variable names in bold 
reflect results further explained below. 
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had been upheld several times until then, thus making the U.S. 
Copyright Act more balanced between authors and consumers. 
The rationale with respect to secondary liability for ISPs is that 
if copyright holders can request ISPs to take down content that 
presumably is infringing their copyright, then less material can be 
freely accessed by consumers on YouTube, Vimeo, Facebook, or 
Google. Thus, piracy tends to be higher because users get access to 
such content by illegal means (e.g., The Pirate Bay103). 
(2) Again, it is intuitive that copyright law measures such as 
private copying regulations and the fair use doctrine are correlated 
to low digital piracy rates. On the one hand, if consumers are 
allowed to make private copies of copyrighted works for their 
personal uses (and thus do not need to purchase another original 
copy), piracy should be reduced. On the other hand, if users have 
more exceptions and limitations to exclusive rights that copyright 
holders own (the fair use doctrine), there is more room for free 
access, and thus less piracy. Some common examples of fair use 
are commentary, search engines, criticism, parody, news reporting, 
research, teaching, library archiving, and scholarship. 
(3) The last—and perhaps most crucial—result of this 
correlation analysis explains that a more pro-copyright holder 
statute is related to higher piracy rates and vice versa (statutes that 
are more pro-consumer are connected to a lower piracy rate in that 
country). 
Other copyright laws also correlate to low digital piracy rates. 
Some of them (a) provision of solutions to copyright clarification 
problems in collective and orphan works; (b) provisions on 
compulsory licenses; (c) provisions on the first sale doctrine or 
exhaustion of rights; and (d) legal forecast of copyleft schemes) are 
tied to lower levels of piracy, as was intuitively foreseen because 
they are pro-consumer-oriented variables. However, the analysis 
also shows some counterintuitive results—in terms of the direct 
relationship model—because a group of copyright measures that 
give more protection to authors are, at the same time, correlated to 
                                                
 103 THE PIRATE BAY, https://thepiratebay.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2016) 
(facilitating primary illegal downloads through peer-to-peer file sharing 
technology, specifically the BitTorrent protocol). 
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lower rates of digital piracy. They are (a) whether computer 
software is considered as a literary work, (b) work-for-hire 
provisions, (c) scope of performance and display rights, (d) scope 
of moral rights, (e) regulation and powers of copyright collecting 
agencies, and (f) remedies for copyright infringement, including 
civil, criminal, and administrative consequences. This issue 
requires further empirical research to better understand the 
interaction between those variables and digital piracy rates. 
Second, correlations between digital piracy rates and the 
control variables were analyzed. Three fields are especially 
relevant in this sense: 
(1) As predicted by the development economics theory, this 
study empirically shows that (a) the richer the country (in terms of 
GDP per capita), the lower its piracy rate; and (b) societies with 
more income inequality (higher values of the Gini index) 
experience higher levels of digital piracy. 
(2) The existence of a legitimate market for intellectual 
property goods (“businessmodels”) is connected to less piracy, but 
not as much as expected.104 This may be explained because the 
only input analyzed was comparable information for the national 
presence/availability of Spotify, Netflix, and iTunes, and not data 
showing their actual use in that country. Thus, although this 
research is in line with the extant literature focusing on specific 
jurisdictions that shows that the greater the use of such business 
models, the less the digital piracy, a stronger correlation could not 
be found due to such methodological limitation. 
(3) As predicted, when a country has higher standards of pro-
copyright social norms and better enforcement for IP infringement, 
piracy rates go down. 
Third, in addition to the Gini index, the only control variable 
that relates to higher digital piracy is unemployment. This means 
that a society with more unemployed people is correlated with 
higher piracy rates. However, this association is very weak.105 The 
rest of control variables are connected to low piracy rates. All the 
                                                
 104 See Page, supra note 37. 
 105 The correlation coefficient between unemployment and digital piracy rate 
is only 0.0878. 
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foreseeable results ((a) annual per capita spending on legitimate 
digital goods; (b) research and development expenditure; and (c) 
adult literacy rate) imply that better socioeconomic indicators 
mean less digital piracy, as mentioned before when assessing the 
development economics theory. Moreover, as it is intuitive as well, 
when the percentage of a country’s population aged sixty-five and 
above is high, there is less digital piracy.106 Results also show that 
both the percentage of Internet users in a given jurisdiction and the 
presence of the Pirate Party are related to lower levels of digital 
piracy. This suggests that societies with more Internet users and 
the Pirate Party as an option for the ballot box are more aware of 
copyright and thus engage less in piracy. Alternatively, this 
correlation may be explained by economics as these two variables 
are related to economic development, which is associated with 
lower rates of digital piracy. 
	  
                                                
 106 The fact that elderly people’s Internet use is lower compared to that of 
younger segments of the population, and they also show inferior levels of digital 
literacy, may account for a lower digital piracy rate compared to nations with 
younger citizens. See Aaron Smith, OLDER ADULTS AND TECHNOLOGY USE 
(Pew Research Center 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/04/03/older-
adults-and-technology-use/; see also Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, 
AMERICAN’S INTERNET ACCESS: 2000–2015 4 (Pew Research Center, 2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/06/2015-06-26_internet-usage-across-
demographics-discover_FINAL.pdf. 
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2. Regression Analysis107 
Using digital piracy rates as Y, the aggregated variable as X, 
and controlling for the W variables, regression analyses were 
employed to get a rough estimate of the effect of piracy on the 
aggregated independent variable. The scatterplot below is a simple 
regression (just the dependent and independent variables) but, 
nevertheless, supports the argument. It shows a relatively steep 
slope, which means that statutes that are more pro-copyright holder 
(and thus less pro-consumer or less pro-free access) are associated 
with higher digital piracy rates: 
 
FIGURE 1. REGRESSION ANALYSIS (I) 
 
 
However, as one can observe in the graph, the dispersion of the 
data points with respect to the regression line is notable. Adding 
control variables will improve these results as represented in the 
following regression table: 
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TABLE 3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS (II) 
dpiracy (Y) (1) OLS (2) GLM 
 aggregated (X) 11.67** 
(4.62) 
Virtually same results 
but the coefficient of 
“aggregated” is here 
statistically 





















 gdpcapita (W1) -0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
 gini (W2) -0.025 
(0.11) 
 unemployment (W3) -0.13 
(0.15) 
 internetusers (W4) -0.29*** 
(0.06) 
 spendinglegitdiggoods (W5) 0.038 
(0.04) 
 businessmodels (W6) -1.66** 
(0.95) 
 researchdevexp (W7) -3.66*** 
(1.19) 
 adultliteracy (W8) 0.15** 
(0.089) 
 oldpopulation (W9) 0.045 
(0.20) 
 procopsocialnorms (W10) 6.5*** 
(1.66) 
 pirateparty (W11) -6.75*** 
(2.10) 
 enforcement (W12) -13.56*** 
(1.94) 
* significant at 90% confidence; ** significant at 95% confidence;  
*** significant at 99% confidence  |  N = 108 
 
Both econometric specifications (Ordinary Least Squares 
[“OLS”] and Generalized Linear Model [“GLM”]) provide almost 
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the same regression coefficients, showing that the results are 
robust. The interpretation of this multiple regression is clear: a 
positive and large coefficient (𝛽!=+11.67) that is statistically 
significant at 95% confidence (or p-value ≤ 0.05) under the OLS 
model. Thus, statutes that are more pro-copyright holder are 
associated with higher digital piracy rates whereas more pro-
consumer regulations are connected to lower levels of piracy. This 
result is consistent with the negative or inverse correlation found 
earlier between piracy rates and the aggregated variable.108 
C. Main Contributions and Policy Recommendations 
The main results of this multivariate assessment, for both the 
correlation and the regression analyses, can be easily summarized. 
This is the first comprehensive cross-national quantitative study on 
comparative copyright law that: 
(1) Identifies the legal measures that are more correlated to 
high digital piracy rates: sweat of the brow and secondary liability 
for ISPs. 
(2) Identifies the legal measures that are more correlated to low 
digital piracy rates: private copying and fair use. 
(3) Proves with statistical significance that statutes that are 
more pro-copyright holder are associated with higher rates of 
digital piracy (and vice versa). 
(4) Validates the development economics literature: the richer 
the country, the lower its piracy rate. 
These outcomes have quite a straightforward implication for 
legislatures when designing copyright regulations, although it may 
upset some sectors of the entertainment industry. To fight digital 
piracy, aside from improving social attitudes, economic indicators, 
judicial enforcement, and legal markets for intellectual property 
products, the trend should be to avoid amendments that increase 
the protection toward copyright holders (e.g., secondary liability 
rules for ISPs). Rather, those legal reforms should follow a 
relatively pro-consumer or pro-free access nature, i.e., fostering 
provisions on private copying or fair use. 
                                                
 108 See supra Table 2. 
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D. Application of the Proposed Policy Guidelines to the United 
States and Spain 
The previous policy suggestions will be applied to the specific 
cases of the United States and Spain to test their reliability. These 
two countries were selected because they are both developed 
nations but show very different levels of digital piracy. Hence, 
provided that the U.S. and the Spanish piracy rates are, 
respectively, very low (18%) and very high (45%), this application 
is expected to find a fair degree of overlap between this article’s 
proposal and the current legal and economic copyright situation in 
the United States, whereas much more divergences are likely to be 
present in the Spanish framework. 
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TABLE 4. COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED POLICY 
GUIDELINES WITH THE CURRENT SITUATION OF  
















dpiracy   18% 45% 
sweatbrow éé îî 0   ✔ 0   ✔ 
softlitwork êê ì 1   ✔ 1   ✔ 
workforhire ê ì 1   ✔ 0   ✖ 
collorphanworks êê ì 1   ✔ 0   ✖ 
performdisplay êê ì 2   ✓ 3   ✔ 
secliabilityisp éé îî 1   ✔ 3   ✖ 
moralrights ê ì 1   ✖ 3   ✔ 
compulsorylicenses êê ì 1   ✔ 1   ✔ 
collectingagencies êê ì 3   ✔ 3   ✔ 
privatecopying êêê ìì 2   ✓ 2   ✓ 
fairuse êêê ìì 3   ✔ 3   ✔ 
firstsale êê ì 1   ✔ 1   ✔ 
remedies êê ì 3   ✔ 3   ✔ 
copyleft ê ì 0   ✖ 0   ✖ 
aggregated éé îî 0.18   ✔ 0.65   ✖ 
gdpcapita êêê ìì 53,042   ✔ 29,863.2   ✗ 
businessmodels êê ì 3   ✔ 2   ✓ 
procopsocialnorms êêê ìì 4.32   ✓ 3.14   ✖ 
enforcement êêê ìì 5.41   ✔ 3.58   ✗ 
RESULTS   15.5/19=82% 10/19=53% 
                                                
 109 See supra Section III.B.1 (providing a description of this data, which come 
from the correlation analysis). 
 110 When the copyright law measure or control variable is correlated to higher 
digital piracy rates, the policy suggestion is to reduce its scope. In contrast, 
when copyright regulations or control variables are connected to lower digital 
piracy rates, then legislatures should tend to expand the extent or range of these 
copyright legal provisions. 
 111 Data from coding outcomes spreadsheet (see infra Table 6). 
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With respect to the ideal panorama—according to the results of 
this article—aiming to combat piracy in the copyright field, the 
current situation in the United States achieves 82% overlap, 
whereas the one in Spain only reaches 53%. These outcomes 
support the practical reliability of these findings and policy 
recommendations because there is a clear connection between 
them and actual digital piracy rates, at least for the United States 
and Spain. 
Thus, although the United States seems to have understood the 
equitable compromise between authors and consumers required to 
incentivize creativity, innovation, and originality, Spain does not 
and still has a serious problem with digital piracy. The country’s 
rate of computer software copyright infringement is 45%, well 
above the European standard of 22-25%.112 In music, movies, video 
games, and literature the piracy rate reaches an extremely high 
84%.113 It gives the impression, then, that the current Spanish 
law—Royal Legislative Decree 1/1996 of April 12, which 
approves the Consolidated text of the Law on Intellectual Property 
(LPI)114—has been unable to successfully react to many of the 
                                                
 112 See BSA Global Software Survey, supra note 13, BSA, THE SOFTWARE 
ALLIANCE, Competitive Advantage: The Economic Impact of Properly Licensed 
Software (2013),  
http://portal.bsa.org/insead/assets/studies/2013softwarevaluestudy_en.pdf. 
Rate of computer software piracy (45%) = market value of pirated content / 
value of the legal and illegal industry, i.e.: $1,044M / $2,320M. Comparative 
data: countries in Central and Northern Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United 
Kingdom) have software piracy rates between 22 and 25%. The situation is even 
better in the United States (18%) and Japan (19%). Within the Spanish 
geopolitical environment, the alarming piracy rate (45%) is only comparable to 
that in France (36%), Italy (47%), and Portugal (40%). 
 113 GfK, Observatorio de Piratería y Hábitos de Consumo de Contenidos 
Digitales 2013 [Observatory of Piracy and Consumption Habits of Digital 
Content] (2014), http://www.cedro.org/docs/default-source/textos-de-
inter%C3%A9s/observatorio-pirateria2013.pdf. Digital piracy rate in music, 
movies, video games, and literature (84%) = market value of pirated content / 
value of the legal and illegal industry, i.e.: €16,136M / €19,210M. 
 114 The LPI experienced its two most significant amendments with Law 
23/2006 of July 7 and Law 21/2014 of November 4. This latter reform—in force 
since January 1, 2015—introduces some important changes to the Spanish 
Copyright Act: (1) harsher fines for copyright infringement; (2) easier 
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issues raised in the copyright field. Moreover, the importance of 
having a better Copyright Act is not negligible at all: Spain would 
be able to capture some of the loss of profits generated by digital 
piracy, valued at over 1.3 billion Euros per year and 26,600 jobs. 
The translation of these figures into relative terms is 
overwhelming: the Spanish entertainment industry (music, movies, 
video games, and literature) could potentially increase its annual 
turnover by 43% and increase job creation in the sector by 42%.115 
In a broader, comparative framework, it is also obvious that the 
proper treatment of copyright must become a legal policy priority 
issue, including taking an economic perspective. The “cultural and 
creative industries” (“CCI”) accounted for 2.6% of the European 
Union’s GDP in 2010, which was significantly higher than 
industries such as real estate, agribusiness, chemical, or 
information and communications technologies, and it provided 
employment to approximately five million people within the EU.116 
In the United States, the CCIs, known as “core copyright 
                                                                                                         
procedures for the government to shut down websites that engage in digital 
piracy; (3) implementation of the “Google tax” (economic compensation for 
news editors and publishers when news aggregators websites use their contents, 
which caused Google News closure in Spain last December); (4) economic 
compensation for private copying—whose scope has been reduced—now paid 
to copyright holders through the Spanish public treasury, instead of being 
directly charged to consumers when they buy some technological products; (5) 
attempt to increase the transparency and efficiency of the copyright collecting 
agencies; and (6) more protection to copyright owners (20 years of additional 
protection for artists, performers, and producers of phonograms, more coverage 
for orphan works, and stricter limits in the use of copyrighted works for 
educational and research purposes). Nonetheless, I will not code this last 
amendment in the Spanish Copyright Act since its effects on digital piracy are 
still unclear (recall that it entered into force on January 1, 2015). 
 115 See GfK, supra note 113. Loss of profits (€1,326M) = market value of 
pirated content multiplied by the average conversion rate of the pirated product 
to the legally acquired product, i.e.: €16,136M * 8.02%. In 2013 the turnover of 
the Spanish music, movie, video game, and literature industries totaled €3,096M 
and 63,578 direct jobs. 
 116 European Commission, Green Paper: Unlocking the Potential of Cultural 
and Creative Industries 2–3 (April 27, 2010), 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0183&from=EN. 
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industries,” represented 6.4% of its GDP in the same year and 
accounted for 3.9% of its employment.117 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This article aims to identify which copyright law measures are 
more related to low/high digital piracy rates. The analysis relied 
primarily on data from WIPO Lex, the BSA, and the World Bank 
and provides a picture of how the copyright universe is today. The 
deployed empirical law and economics methodology consisted of a 
content analysis of significantly selected copyright law measures 
that have been more or less broadly implemented, or that have 
been dismissed, by 108 countries in their current national copyright 
statutes. The resultant coding scheme achieved a high degree of 
replicability, which is essential to increase the accuracy of its 
conclusions. 
After processing the database with econometric tools, the 
findings suggest that (1) the legal measures that are more 
correlated to high digital piracy rates are the sweat of the brow 
doctrine and secondary liability rules for ISPs; (2) the ones more 
correlated to low piracy rates are private copying and fair use 
provisions; (3) statutes that favor copyright holders are associated 
with greater rates of digital piracy (and vice versa); and (4) richer 
countries show lower levels of copyright infringement, which 
validates the development economics theory. Because there is no 
existing literature in the field with the scope that this article offers, 
these results constitute the first step toward a comprehensive cross-
national quantitative study on comparative copyright law and 
digital piracy, both in descriptive and explanatory terms. 
These outcomes have a straightforward implication for 
policymakers when designing copyright regulations, although it 
may upset some sectors of the entertainment industry. To fight 
digital piracy, legislatures should avoid amendments that increase 
protections toward copyright holders (e.g., secondary liability rules 
for ISPs). Instead, these results show that the most effective legal 
                                                
 117 Stephen E. Siwek, Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy: The 2011 
Report, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE (2011),  
http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2011CopyrightIndustriesReport.PDF. 
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reforms are pro-consumer, such as fostering private copying or fair 
use. Legislators should also continue seeking amendments that 
may improve social attitudes, economic indicators, judicial 
enforcement, and legal markets for intellectual property goods. 
With respect to that ideal panorama to combat piracy in the 
copyright field, the current situation in the United States achieves a 
high degree of overlap, whereas the one in Spain is much more 
limited. This supports the practical reliability of the results and the 
suggested policy guidelines laid out in this paper, as there is a clear 
connection between these findings and actual digital piracy rates, 
at least for the United States and Spain. 
These recommendations, which especially target legislatures 
and governments, are in line with building a new—and 
economically viable—regulatory copyright model. Hopefully, it 
may help in reducing piracy rates, correcting the global tension 
between authors and consumers in the digital era, and thus leading 
society to greater heights of wellbeing. 
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VI. APPENDIX 
 
TABLE 5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Observ. Mean Stand. Dev. Min. Max. 
dpiracy 108 58.36 21.76 18 91 
sweatbrow 108 0.25 0.44 0 1 
softlitwork 108 0.76 0.43 0 1 
workforhire 108 0.12 0.33 0 1 
collorphanworks 108 0.20 0.40 0 1 
performdisplay 108 2.06 0.96 0 3 
secliabilityisp 108 1.89 0.75 0 3 
moralrights 108 2.19 0.90 0 3 
compulsorylicenses 108 0.67 0.47 0 1 
collectingagencies 108 1.82 1.14 0 3 
privatecopying 108 1.79 1.05 0 3 
fairuse 108 1.68 1.08 0 3 
firstsale 108 0.75 0.44 0 1 
remedies 108 2.14 0.91 0 3 
copyleft 108 0.06 0.23 0 1 
aggregated 108 0.46 0.18 0 0.74 
gdpcapita 108 20,786.51 23,114.95 953.40 110,697 
gini 108 37.46 8.66 24.80 65 
unemployment 108 8.98 6.04 0.50 29 
internetusers 108 55.62 24.87 2.60 96.50 
spendinglegitdig. 108 28.45 45.75 0.02 254.66 
businessmodels 108 1.55 1.11 0 3 
researchdevexp 108 0.95 1.00 0.02 4.04 
region 108 2.91 1.38 1 5 
adultliteracy 108 91.77 12.64 41 100 
oldpopulation 108 10.29 5.90 0.42 25.08 
procopsocialnorms 108 3.72 1.19 1.69 6.32 
pirateparty 108 0.51 0.50 0 1 
enforcement 108 3.97 1.11 1.63 6.19 
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TABLE 6. CODING OUTCOMES 
Visit https://goo.gl/Khd6ST to download the coding outcomes 
spreadsheet. To quickly identify the dichotomy, greener cells in the 
Excel file indicate more pro-consumer/pro-free access copyright 
regulations, whereas redder cells indicate more pro-copyright 
holder provisions. 
